​CRIMINAL LAW



Independent Reason for Incarceration Precludes Habeas Corpus Relief

In affirming the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, the Third Department noted that even where the basis for the petition is valid (here there was no preliminary hearing for a parole violation) habeas relief is not available if there is an independent basis for continued incarceration (here an indictment for the offense underlying the parole violation):
 

Regardless of the merits of petitioner's claim that he was deprived of a preliminary hearing, an independent basis for his parole revocation exists given his conviction upon the count charged in the indictment (see Executive Law § 259-i [3] [d] [iii]…). Petitioner is thus not entitled to immediate release, rendering habeas corpus relief unavailable … .  People ex rel Wiggins v Schiff, 515008, 4-25-13







Conviction Reversed Because of Improper Cross-Examination by Prosecutor/Defendant Questioned About Boyfriend’s Criminal History and Her Employment History

The First Department reversed a conviction because of the prosecutor’s improper cross-examination of the defendant.  The defendant was accused of smuggling a knife to her boyfriend while he was incarcerated.  The defendant was cross-examined about her boyfriend’s gang membership and criminal history and defendant’s periods of unemployment (among other improper topics).  In addressing the cross-examination about defendant’s boyfriend’s criminal history, the First Department wrote:
 

            The criminal history of defendant’s boyfriend was irrelevant to whether defendant “knowingly and unlawfully introduce[d] any dangerous contraband into a detention facility” … . The fact that Wright was a gang member with an extensive criminal history has no bearing on whether or not defendant knew she was introducing dangerous contraband into the facility, and could only serve to inflame the jury and prejudice defendant. As defendant correctly argues, this evidence served “no purpose but to suggest that defendant was associated with a disreputable person” … . People v Bartholomew, 2013 NY Slip Op 02699, 1st Dept, 4-23-13







Failure to Follow Statutory Procedure Re: Notes Sent Out By Jury Is a “Mode of Proceedings” Error Requiring Reversal

In reversing a conviction because the trial court committed a “mode of proceedings” error (not requiring preservation) by not following the procedure mandated in Criminal Procedure Law 310.30 (re: notes sent out by the jury during deliberations), the Second Department explained:
 

          "Specifically, the Court of Appeals has held that whenever a substantive written jury communication is received by the Judge,' it should be read into the record in the presence of counsel,' and that, [a]fter the contents of the inquiry are placed on the record, counsel should be afforded a full opportunity to suggest appropriate responses'" … . These requirements were not satisfied here. People v Fenton, 2013 NY Slip Op 02761, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13







Restitution Can Not Be Ordered When Not Addressed in Plea Agreement
 

The Second Department, in the interest of justice, determined the sentencing court should not have imposed restitution because restitution was not addressed in the plea agreement.  The matter was remitted for re-sentencing without restitution. People v Thompson, 2013 NY Slip Op 02770, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13

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Fact that Defendant Was Seen With a .25 Caliber Handgun Two and a Half Months Before Charged Shooting Allowed In Evidence to Prove “Identity”



The defendant was convicted of shooting the victim with a .25 caliber handgun.  Under Molineux, the prosecution was allowed to present evidence that the defendant, two and a half months before, was seen brandishing a .25 caliber handgun.  The trial court determined this “prior crime” evidence was admissible to prove the identity of the shooter.  The Third Department affirmed with a strong dissent.  The quotation below, which is from the dissent, outlines one of the elements of a Molineux analysis of prior-crime evidence to prove identity:



​            [THE FOLLOWING QUOTATION IS FROM THE DISSENT]



           The mere fact that defendant was allegedly seen with a .25 caliber weapon on an occasion over two months prior to the crime does not reveal any unique and distinctive modus operandi, nor a "distinctive repetitive pattern"  … . The only behavior described was the act of pulling out a gun – there is nothing unique or distinctive about this act, standing alone – and the weapon was not fired during the alleged earlier incident. Defendant's mere presence in the same place twice is certainly not unusual, as other people were also present on both occasions. There was simply no evidence that might be considered "'so unique that the mere proof that . . . defendant had committed a similar act would be highly probative of the fact that he committed the one charged'" … .  People v Myers, 104004, 3rd Dept, 4-25-13







Convictions Based Entirely Upon Confession Reversed/Error to Allow Experiment in Evidence/Proof of Victim’s Helplessness Sufficient



In this sexual-crimes case, the Third Department discussed (among other issues): (1) the application of speedy trial rules when an initial indictment is dismissed and then charges stemming from the same incident are brought more than six months later in a second indictment; (2) the sufficiency of proof of the victim’s helplessness (intoxication); and (3) the inadmissibility of an experiment (opening a door with a credit card to demonstrate how defendant could have entered the house) which had nothing to do with the trial evidence.  All but two of the convictions were affirmed.  In reversing the two convictions which were based entirely on the defendant’s confession, the Third Department wrote:

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           We find that defendant's convictions of criminal sexual act in the first degree must  be  reversed. "A person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him [or her] without additional proof that the offense charged  has been  committed"  (CPL 60.50). While this additional proof "need  not corroborate every detail of the confession" …, both  of defendant's criminal sexual act convictions were based solely upon his uncorroborated admissions that he  performed  oral sex on the victim. Defendant's presence at the scene did not provide the necessary corroboration because the issue is not his identity or connection to the crime but, instead, whether  the crimes  occurred  at all. As there was no corroborating proof "of whatever weight," these charges must be dismissed… . People v Bjork, 104014, 3rd Dept, 4-25-13







SORA Proof Burdens Explained



The Third Department noted the different proof burdens for a SORA classification hearing versus a modification hearing:



           The People concede that defendant is entitled to a new hearing because Supreme Court treated the 2005 rehearing as one for modification, as opposed to classification (compare Correction Law § 168-n, with Correction Law § 168-o).   As the People now acknowledge, they bore the burden of establishing the determination sought by clear and convincing evidence … .  Inasmuch as the record here reflects that the burden was placed on defendant to demonstrate sufficient evidence warranting a departure from the risk level III classification (see Correction Law § 168-o [2]), we remit for a new hearing … . People v Middlemiss, 511311, 3rd Dept, 4-25-13







Admission in Evidence of Defendant’s Statements About Prior Murders Did Not Rise to a Constitutional Injury---Harmless Error Doctrine Applied


The Court of Appeals held that the admission at trial of statements made by the defendant indicating he had committed murders other than the murder with which he was charged “did not rise to the level of constitutional injury such as ineffectiveness of counsel or juror partiality.”  Therefore, the harmless error doctrine applied and, in light of the evidence against the defendant, the conviction was affirmed.  People v Byer, No 84, CtApp, 4-25-13







DISCIPLINARY HEARING (INMATES)



Misbehavior Report Did Not Supply Sufficient Notice of Alleged Offense

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In annulling a disciplinary finding, the Third Department held the misbehavior report did not provide sufficient notice of the alleged offense:

           Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because the misbehavior report failed to comply with the particularity requirements of 7 NYCRR 251-3.1 (c). This regulation provides that a misbehavior report must set forth "the date, time and place of the offense, . . . the disciplinary rule alleged to have been violated and . . . the factual basis for the charge with enough particularity to enable the inmate to prepare a defense" (… 7 NYCRR 251-3.1 [c]). Here, the misbehavior report, which was prepared by the correction officer who tested the substance, simply stated that a substance given to him by another correction officer tested positive for marihuana. Significantly, it did not indicate that the officer who gave him the substance obtained it from petitioner's cell nor did it provide any details as to exactly where the substance was found.  To add to the confusion, the report listed the location of the incident as the "chart office."  Matter of Simmons v Fischer, 514873, 3rd Dept, 4-25-13







FAMILY LAW



Mother Not Given Sufficient Opportunity to Substantiate Her Income

In finding Family Court did not have a sufficient basis to determine the mother failed to substantiate her income in a child support proceeding, the Second Department wrote:

           The Support Magistrate improperly awarded child support based on the needs of the child rather than the mother's income, upon concluding that the mother failed to substantiate her income (see Family Ct Act § 413[1][k]). The record reflects that, prior to the hearing at which the Support Magistrate issued the order, the mother had appeared before the Support Magistrate only twice and, on both occasions, the appearances were very brief. … Moreover, the Support Magistrate failed to advise the mother that her failure to fill out the financial disclosure affidavit would result in an award of support based on the child's needs, instead of the mother's income … . Accordingly, the matter must be remitted … for a new hearing on the petition and a new determination thereafter as to the mother's support obligation.  Matter of Anderson v Pappalardo, 2013 NY Slip Op 02745, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13





Best Interests of Child Allowed Mother’s Relocation

In reversing Family Court’s determination the best interests of the child did not permit the mother’s relocation, the Second Department wrote:
 

           After weighing the appropriate factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea …, we find that the mother established by a preponderance of the evidence that the children's best interests would be served by permitting the relocation … .
           

           The mother demonstrated that she could not meet the family's living expenses in New York and that the father did not make regular child support payments …. She also demonstrated that, if permitted to relocate, she would accept an offer of employment in her field of experience, and would receive financial assistance, including housing and a car, from extended family members … . The desires of the children, while properly considered, are not determinative … . Matter of Tracy A G v Undine J, 2013 NY Slip Op 02751, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13





Social Services Motion to Be Relieved of Obligation to Make Efforts to Return Child to Father Granted Even Though Neglect Finding Against Mother Only
 

Family Court granted a motion by social services to be relieved of its obligation to make further reasonable efforts to return the child to the father.  The child was in foster care after a neglect proceeding against the mother.  In holding that the motion was properly brought and granted, even though a finding of neglect had been made only against the mother, the Third Department wrote:
   

           A  social services agency may  move  to be  relieved of its obligation to undertake  reasonable efforts to return a child to his or her home  "[i]n conjunction with, or at any time subsequent to, the filing of" an abuse or neglect petition (Family Ct Act §  1039-b  [a]). Here, while a neglect petition was filed solely against the mother, contrary to the father's contention, nothing  in Family Ct Act §  1039-b  limits its scope to the respondent(s) named  in the underlying petition. Moreover, to infer such a limitation would undercut the purpose of the statute, which was intended to promote the health and safety of the child by expediting permanency planning… .  Matter of Jayden QQ., 513777, 3rd Dept, 4-25-13





Grant of Visitation to Grandmother Reversed



In reversing Family Court’s grant of visitation rights to the children’s grandmother (more than what the mother wanted to allow), the Third Department wrote:



           Where, as here, the parents of children are alive, Domestic Relations Law § 72 gives grandparents the right to seek visitation with their grandchildren where, as a threshold matter, they can establish circumstances in which "equity would see fit to intervene," i.e., that equitable circumstances exist (Domestic Relations Law § 72 [1]…). * * * Upon our review of the testimony, we conclude that petitioner  did  not  establish  equitable  circumstances  that  justify according her standing to force the mother to accept visitation outside parameters  within which  she is comfortable as a fit and responsible parent … .  “[C]ourts should  not  lightly intrude on  the family  relationship  against  a  fit parent's  wishes. The presumption that a fit parent's decisions are in the child's best interests is a strong one" …  Matter of Hill v Juhase, 514036, 3rd Dept, 4-25-13





“Depraved Indifference to Human Life” Defined Differently in Family Law, as Opposed to Criminal Law, Context​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, determined that the phrase “depraved indifference to human life” as it is used in Social Services Law 384-b(8)(a)(i) to define when a child has been “severely abused” does not have the meaning ascribed to the same phrase under the Penal Law.  In addition, the court clarified the statutory conditions which relieve a social services agency of the requirement to make diligent efforts to reunite the child with the abusive parent.  Judge Read wrote:
 

            Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) (i) provides that a child can be found to be severely abused “as a result of reckless or intentional acts of the parent committed under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life” (emphases added). Under the Penal Law, however, a crime requiring proof of an intent to kill can never be committed with depraved indifference … [“[I]t has never been permissible in New York for a jury to convict a defendant of depraved indifference murder where the evidence produced at trial indicated that if the defendant committed homicide at all, he committed it with the conscious objective of killing the victim” … . Additionally, “[a] defendant may be convicted of depraved indifference murder when but a single person is endangered in only a few rare circumstances” …, whereas acts of child abuse necessarily involve one-on-one violence. In short, our depraved indifference jurisprudence under the Penal Law has no bearing on whether a child is severely abused within the meaning of Social Services Law § 384-b (8) (a) (i). For purposes of that statute “circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life” refers to the risk intentionally or recklessly posed to the child by the parent’s abusive conduct.  Matter of Dashawn W …, No 71, CtApp, 4-25-13







WORKERS' COMPENSATION



Employee-Status Proven and Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity Provision Applied/Employee’s Jumping from Stalled Elevator Was Superseding Cause of Accident

The First Department determined the respondent, Plaza Residences, could assert the Workers’ Compensation defense even though petitioner believed he was working for a nonparty (Wavecrest Management, Inc) which directed and controlled his work:
 

           The Workers' Compensation exclusivity provision applies to those employers, and their agents, that exercise supervision and control over an employee …. Here, the evidence establishes that an actual employment relationship exited between plaintiff and Plaza Residences. Such evidence includes Plaza Residences' payroll records, state withholding tax and unemployment returns, plaintiff's own W-2 form, and copies of cancelled paychecks. Each of these documents identified Plaza Residences as plaintiff's employer, and the fact that Plaza Residences relinquished all authority to nonparty Wavecrest Management, Inc., which directed and controlled plaintiff's work, did not preclude Plaza Residences from asserting the Workers' Compensation defense.

The First Department also determined petitioner’s jumping from a stalled elevator was “an unforeseeable, superseding cause of his accident” and dismissal of his complaint was therefore warranted. Clifford v Plaza Hous Dev Fund Co, Inc, 2013 NY Slip Op 02695, 9871, 305519/08, 1st Dept, 4-23-13





Defendant Was Not Plaintiff’s “Special Employer”

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In finding defendant was not plaintiff’s (Vasquez’) “special employer” (and therefore could not take advantage of the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law), the First Department wrote:
 

           Defendant's motion for summary judgment, made on the ground that the complaint is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law (see Workers' Compensation Law § § 11, 29[6] …, was properly denied. Defendant maintains that it was Vasquez's special employer because it hired all building employees, including Vasquez, and was also responsible for firing. However, plaintiff asserts the evidence establishes that defendant was not Vasquez's special employer. Specifically, the property owner, not defendant, paid and provided benefits to Vasquez. Defendant's evidence failed to establish as a matter of law that it "control[led] and direct[ed] the manner, details and ultimate result of" Vasquez's work …, and plaintiff acknowledges questions of fact exist on this issue. If the issue of defendant's status as a special employer is resolved in plaintiff's favor, plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on liability on her Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Vasquez v Cohen Bros Realty Corp, 2013 NY Slip Op 02682, 1st Dept, 4-23-13​

 



LABOR LAW



Construction Manager Not Liable Unless Delegated Authority of General Manager

In finding the action against a construction manager should have been dismissed because the construction manager had not been delegated the responsibilities of a general contractor, the Second Department wrote:
 

           "Although a construction manager is generally not considered a contractor responsible for the safety of the workers at a construction site . . . it may nonetheless become responsible if it has been delegated the authority and duties of a general contractor, or if it functions as an agent of the owner of the premises" . " A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or general contractor under the Labor Law when it has supervisory control and authority over the work being done where a plaintiff is injured”… . The defendant … made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing, through the admission of construction documents and agreements and the deposition testimony of the parties, that it had not been delegated the authority and duties of a general contractor, and did not have supervisory control and authority over the work being done … . McLaren v Turner Constr Co, 2013 NY Slip Op 02726, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13

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CIVIL PROCEDURE/CLASS ACTIONS



Class Certification in Landlord-Tenant Action Upheld

The First Department upheld Supreme Court’s grant of class certification in an action alleging defendant landlord charged market rents while accepting J-51 [tax incentive] benefits.  The First Department wrote:
 

             The issues of when defendant received J-51 benefits, whether defendant deregulated apartments while receiving those benefits, which tenants resided in those apartments during those time periods, and whether defendant wrongfully charged market rents while accepting J-51 benefits are common issues that "predominate," thereby meeting the commonality requirement of CPLR 902(a)(2)… . The need to conduct individualized damages inquiries does not obviate the utility of the class mechanism for this action, given the predominant common issues of liability … .
 

            Defendant's counterclaim for rent arrears does not cause plaintiff to be an atypical member of the class. Her claim is typical of the claims of all class members in that each flows from defendant's alleged unlawful deregulation of apartments while receiving J-51 benefits … . "[T]hat the underlying facts of each individual plaintiff's claim vary, or that [defendant's] defenses vary, does not preclude class certification" …. Defendant's counterclaim does not materially add to the complexity or difficulty of resolving plaintiff's individual claim, and defendant's suggestion that plaintiff might be inclined to settle her case to evade liability on the counterclaim is speculative.  Bordern v 400 East 55th Street Associates, LP, 2013 NY Slip Op 02315, 1st Dept, 4-25-13





Class Certification Should Have Been Granted/Plaintiffs Waived Statutory Treble Damages



            The First Department reversed the dismissal of a putative class action by tenants against a landlord alleging the landlord deregulated the apartments while receiving tax incentive benefits from the city.  Because the tenants waived the statutory treble damages provision, the First Department determined that the case no longer involved “penalties” and was therefore not precluded by CPLR 901.  In a full-fledged opinion by Justice Andrias, the First Department wrote:Pursuant to CPLR 901(b), "[u]nless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained in a class action." However, even where a statute creates or imposes a penalty, the restriction of CPLR 901(b) is inapplicable where the class representative seeks to recover only actual damages and waives the penalty on behalf of the class, and individual class members are allowed to opt out of the class to pursue their punitive damages. … . * * * Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) § 2520.13, which states that "[a]n agreement by the tenant to waive the benefit of any provision of the RSL or this Code is void," does not require a different result. "[P]laintiffs are seeking to waive their entitlement to treble damages unilaterally, not through agreement. Thus, allowing the class action to proceed would not frustrate the RSC's purpose of [avoiding] situations whereby the landlord attempts to circumvent the [RSC's] benefits" … . Downing v First Lenox Terrace Assoc, 2013 NY Slip Op 02853, 1st Dept, 4-25-13



Class Certification Properly Granted/Rent Overcharge and Attorney’s-Fees Claims Did Not Seek “Penalties” In Violation of CPLR 901
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The First Department affirmed the grant of class certification in a landlord-tenant action finding that plaintiff’s rent overcharge claim and attorney’s-fees claim did not seek “penalties” in violation of CPLR 901.  There was a dissent.  The First Department wrote:

          

           Although plaintiff did not waive her right to reimbursement for alleged overcharges and interest, these claims did not render her action an action for a penalty for purposes of CPLR 901(b), even though such recovery is denominated a penalty by the RSL [Rent Stabilization Law], because they lack a punitive, deterrent and litigation-incentivizing purpose ….

          

           Nor did the attorneys’ fees request seek a penalty, as the general right to attorneys’ fees in landlord-tenant proceedings (Real Property Law § 234) does not apply to administrative proceedings …, and the RSL provision should be understood as having the same nonpunitive purpose as the statute applicable to actions and summary proceedings. Notably, the reference in Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) § 2526.1(d) to attorneys’ fees as an “additional penalty,” while otherwise not dispositive, is absent from the attorney fee provision in the legislatively enacted RSL. Gudz v Jemrock Realty Co, LLC, 2013 NY SlipOp 02814, 1st Dept, 4-25-13



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CIVIL PROCEDURE



Product Warranty Does Not Extend Statute of Limitations

In finding that a 10-year warranty on windows and doors did not extend the relevant statute of limitations, the First Department wrote:
 

            Although initially it may seem somewhat unfair for defendant to have given plaintiffs a 10-year warranty and then argue that plaintiffs cannot sue for breach of warranty at any time during that 10-year period, the case law is clear on when this cause of action accrues …. Katopodis v Marvin Windows & Doors, 2013 NY Slip Op 02817, 1st Dept, 4-25-13

Question of Fact Raised by Verified Pleadings Re When Accident Happened
 

The Court of Appeals (with a dissent) held that a question of fact about when an accident occurred had been raised by plaintiff’s verified pleadings.  The defendant submitted evidence the accident occurred on February 5, making plaintiff’s action untimely.  Plaintiff’s verified pleadings stated the accident occurred on February 10, making plaintiff’s action timely.  In light of the question of fact raised by the verified pleadings, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant.  Sanchez v National Railroad Passenger Corp, No 76, CtApp, 4-25-13

Proof Submitted in Reply Papers Not Considered

In finding plaintiffs’ claim for indemnification was not supported by proof plaintiffs had actually paid the debts for which they sought reimbursement, the Second Department noted that the debt-payment-proof submitted in reply papers could not be considered:

            With limited exceptions not applicable here, a cause of action seeking indemnification is not enforceable until payment is made or a loss is suffered by the party seeking indemnification …. Here, the plaintiffs failed to establish, prima facie, that they actually paid any of the debts … . The plaintiffs' proof on that issue, which was submitted for the first time in their reply papers, may not be considered for purposes of establishing their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … .  Gamparo v Mathai, 2013 NY Slip Op 02711, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13





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CIVIL PROCEDURE/CONTRACT



Contractual Shortened Statute of Limitations Okay

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The Second Department held that a shortened statute of limitations agreed to in an employment contract was enforceable:

           “The parties to a contract may agree to limit the period of time within which an action must be commenced to a period shorter than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations” (…see CPLR 201…). “ Absent proof that the contract is one of adhesion or the product of overreaching, or that [the] altered period is unreasonably short, the abbreviated period of limitation will be enforced” … . Hunt v Raymour & Flanigan, 2013 NY Slip Op 02715, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13







CONTRACT



Forum Selection Clause Upheld/Not Shown to Be Unreasonable

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In upholding the validity of a contractual forum selection clause, the Second Department wrote:

           "Although once disfavored by the courts, it is now recognized that parties to a contract may freely select a forum which will resolve any disputes over the interpretation or performance of the contract" … "A contractual forum selection clause is prima facie valid and enforceable unless it is shown by the challenging party to be unreasonable, unjust, in contravention of public policy, invalid due to fraud or overreaching, or it is shown that a trial in the selected forum would be so gravely difficult that the challenging party would, for all practical purposes, be deprived of its day in court" … . Lifetime Brands, Inc v Garden Ridge, LP, 2013 NY Slip Op 02721, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13

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TRIAL PROCEDURE



Consolidation of Trials Okay Even If Some Prejudice Results/Potential for Inconsistent Verdicts Eliminated by Consolidation

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In a personal injury action, the fact that consolidation of two actions arising from the same accident will result in the jury learning of the existence of insurance did not warrant the denial of the motion to consolidate.  The Second Department wrote:

           The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to order consolidation … . The interests of justice and judicial economy are better served by consolidation in those cases where the actions share material questions of law or fact … . A motion to consolidate should be granted absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right by a party opposing the motion .. . Here, the appellants principally argued that they would be prejudiced if the two actions are tried before the same jury since it will bring to the jury's attention the existence of insurance in Action No. 1 …. However, even assuming that under the circumstances of this case, the appellants would be prejudiced by consolidation, any such prejudice is outweighed by the possibility of inconsistent verdicts if separate trials ensue … . Furthermore, the possibility of such prejudice to the appellants can be mitigated by appropriate jury instructions.  Hanover Ins Group v Mezansky, 2013 NY Slip Op 02713, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13